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I. PERTINENT RULES AND REGULATIONS 
Proposed Rules of the Department of Employment 
Security, Rule A 71-07-1:5(a)(3)(a) 
a. Culpability 
This is the seriousness of the conduct 
as it affects continuance of the employment 
relationship. The discharge must have been 
necessary to avoid actual or potential harm 
to the employer's rightful interests. A 
discharge would not be considered 
"necessary" if it is not consistent with 
reasonable employment practices. The 
wrongness of the conduct must be considered 
in the context of the particular employment 
and how it affects the employer's rights. 
If the conduct was an isolated incident of 
poor judgment and there is no expectation 
that the conduct will be continued or 
repeated, potential harm may not be shown 
and therefore it is not necessary to 
discharge the employee. 
II. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Respondents contend in their brief that the record 
before this Court does not substantiate the presence of the 
required factors of knowledge and culpability sufficient to 
establish claimant's fault essential for a determination of 
ineligibility for unemployment benefits. Respondents also 
contend that a lack of adequate warning and clear, unambiguous 
rules consistently enforced by the employer failed to give 
claimant the knowledge that his actions would result in 
termination. Finally, respondents assert that claimant's 
conduct in this case was not sufficiently serious to rise to 
the level of culpability necessary to find fault to satisfy the 
termination for "just cause" requirement. 
These arguments ignore the clear, undisputed evidence 
in the record before this Court, which establishes the 
necessary elements for claimant's termination for just cause, 
and the Board's decision to the contrary is unsupported by the 
record. 
III. ARGUMENT 
A. THE RECORD ESTABLISHES THE SERIOUSNESS OF 
CLAIMANT'S CONDUCT SUFFICIENT TO MEET THE 
CULPABILITY REQUIREMENT. 
Respondents have, in effect, asked this Court to 
determine the culpability of the claimant by subjectively 
determining the seriousness of his conduct in the instant case, 
essentially by comparing it to that of claimants in cases from 
other jurisdictions. These cases involve various acts of 
misconduct by employees in varied employment situations who 
were later dismissed by their employers. This case law is 
inapposite, since the evidence of record clearly establishes 
the requisite seriousness of conduct in this specific case. 
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Rule A71-07-l:5(a)(3)(a), proposed Rules of the 
Department of Employment Security, defines culpability as 
follows: 
a. Culpability 
This is the seriousness of the conduct 
as it affects continuance of the employment 
relationship. The discharge must have been 
necessary to avoid actual or potential harm 
to the employer's rightful interests. A 
discharge would not be considered 
"necessary" if it is not consistent with 
reasonable employment practices. The 
wrongness of the conduct must be considered 
in the context of the particular employment 
and how it affects the employer's 
rights . . . . 
It is undisputed in the record that the nature of 
petitioner Terminal Service Co.'s business of assembly 
line-like installation of truck bumpers and performing pick-up 
and delivery services is one that requires punctuality and 
regular attendance by employees. (R. 0041-42). Time schedules 
need to be met by Terminal based on the demanding and 
unrelenting schedules of the railroad trains coming in and out 
of Salt Lake City. (R. 0020 and 0044). 
The Rule quoted above clearly sets forth that the 
seriousness of conduct in these types of cases is seen in the 
context of each "particular employment" and the "actual or 
potential harm" to a specific employer. Terminal Service Co. 
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has a different type of business, different needs and different 
employment requirements, which are set forth clearly in the 
record, than any of the employment situations set forth in the 
myriad of cases respondents cite. Substantial undisputed 
evidence is before this Court that Terminal Service Co. is 
potentially harmed by conduct such as the claimant's tardiness 
and absenteeism due to the petitioner's time constraints and 
the flow of its work (R. 0044), and that discharge was 
necessary to avoid harming Terminal Service Company's business. 
The Board of Review determined that claimant's conduct 
was not sufficiently culpable to disqualify him for benefits. 
The opposite conclusion is mandated by the facts established in 
the record before this Court. The Board's determination was 
therefore not reasonable, and this Court should set aside that 
determination as being without substantial support in the 
record and hence arbitrary and capricious. 
B. KNOWLEDGE OF WHAT CONDUCT WAS EXPECTED OF 
CLAIMANT BY TERMINAL SERVICE CO. IS WELL 
SUBSTANTIATED IN THE RECORD. 
Respondents contend that the record shows that 
claimant lacked the requisite knowledge as to Terminal Service 
Co.'s expectations of him in its employment. 
Quite the opposite, the record indicates that claimant 
knew what conduct was expected of him from the very beginning 
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of his employment with Terminal. Petitioner's company policy 
regarding what is required of newly hired employees was 
explained in the hearing by a representative of petitioner:. 
New employees are told they must have a valid driver's license, 
transportation to and from work and must be willing to work 
Sunday through Friday, inclusive, 6 days per week. (R. 0041). 
Another representative of petitioner testified that "[w]hen he 
(claimant) first came to work, I stipulated that he's got to be 
here (at work) unless it's an illness or something, and this is 
what we (employer and employee) understand." (R. 0044). 
This notification at the onset of employment should be 
considered adequate warning and notification of expectations to 
an employee, but claimant had further notice and warning. In 
the first few weeks of claimant's employment, claimant admits 
he was tardy and that his boss talked to him about his 
tardiness. (R. 0055). Terminal's work supervisor verified 
that this warning took place and that claimant was told "I 
cannot have this" absenteeism and tardiness. (R. 0044). 
Claimant admits that he knew the company policy was 
that he was to ask for days off in advance, and that he had 
done it plenty of times. (R. 0056 and 0049) In fact, it is 
undisputed that just the week before the absenteeism for which 
termination occurred, the claimant asked Terminal's 
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representative for Sunday off and was told that if he didn't 
come in, "just don't come back to work", and that he would be 
fired for not coming to work. (R. 0056 and 0050) 
All these occurrences clearly gave adequate warning of 
what conduct was expected of the claimant by petitioner. The 
record is clear that claimant knew it was very important that 
he be at work. Therefore, the Board of Review's finding that 
"the employer had not documented the claimant's past tardies or 
absences or its warnings to the claimant that he would be 
terminated in the event he was again absent or tardy" is not 
supported by any evidence in the record. These warnings and 
notice of what conduct was expected of claimant by petitioner 
were essentially admitted by the claimant in the hearing. The 
Board's finding to the contrary was unsupported by any evidence 
before it and should accordingly be set aside by this Court. 
Respondents contend a lack of knowledge or warning to 
claimant through alleged inconsistencies of the petitioner, 
characterized by respondents as "discrimination." The matter 
of discrimination is simply not an issue in this case, and is 
not a valid basis for asserting lack of knowledge by claimant. 
In their brief, respondents assert that petitioner did 
not dispute claimant's general allegation that other employees 
had also been tardy or absent and had not been terminated. 
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This statement is not supported by the record. Petitioner's 
representative said that to his recollection he did not know of 
"a situation where an employee would come in without calling or 
didn't show up without calling and he was not terminated." 
(R. 0052) Terminal's representative testified that "race, 
color, sex or religion plays no part in the way an employee is 
treated. . . " (R. 0020), and that all employees are treated in 
the same manner. 
The Board, however, found that "employees were allowed 
to be absent without similar disciplinary action being taken 
against them." This finding was not based on any competent 
evidence before it, and can only conceivably be traced to 
claimant's conclusory statements to this effect, made without 
foundation and without specifics. (R. 0055-56) 
Respondents would ask this Court to draw a number of 
conclusions unsubstantiated by the evidence in the record 
regarding claimant's lack of understanding and knowledge of the 
conduct expected of him by petitioner. In essence, respondents 
would have this Court speculate as to what the claimant knew or 
understood, when that understanding is established by the 
evidence of record. 
Respondents argue that the record shows that 
petitioner's employees take turns having Sunday off (R. 0057), 
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and that claimant could therefore expect it was his turn to 
have the Sunday in question off. To the contrary, petitioner's 
representative stated in the record that every employee works 6 
days a week including every Sunday (R. 0041 and 0042) unless 
they specifically request a day off (R. 0049), and claimant 
admitted that an employee had to ask for a day off two or three 
days ahead of time. (R. 0049) The evidence does not support a 
finding, as argued by respondents, that claimant expected his 
employer to authorize Sunday off by claimant's calling in 
fifteen minutes before his shift was to begin. 
Claimant did not state, as asserted by respondents, 
that he expected the petitioner to send transportation to pick 
him up to take him to work on Sunday if he were needed and if 
petitioner wanted him to come to work. The offer of a ride to 
work was a general one made earlier to claimant that he took 
advantage of on at least one occasion. (R. 0053) Nor did 
claimant state that he was under compulsion analogous to 
illness to get his truck repaired. The record shows that on 
Monday the claimant felt a strong need to have the truck moved 
from where it had stalled, but told his girlfriend to pass the 
message to his boss that he would be in to work later. (R. 
0055) Claimant was aware of the open offer of a ride to work 
whenever his truck broke down. (R. 0053) 
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The Board of Review's finding of claimant's lack of 
knowledge of the conduct expected of him is thus not supported 
by any substantial evidence in the record and must be 
considered unreasonable. This Court should therefore set aside 
the Board's ruling, rather than reach for unsupported 
conclusions, as respondents would have this Court do. 
CONCLUSION 
The record establishes that claimant had adequate 
warning that absenteeism and tardiness could and would not be 
tolerated by his employer. Claimant clearly understood the 
company policy on requesting days off and knew what conduct was 
expected of him. 
The seriousness of claimant's conduct, supported by 
substantial evidence in the record, rises to the level of 
culpability needed to establish fault to require a 
disqualification for unemployment benefits. 
The Board's decision is thus not supported by the 
evidence of record and must be considered arbitrary and 
unreasonable. Petitioner Terminal Service Co. therefore 
respectfully requests that this Court reverse the Board's 
decision granting the claimant unemployment benefits, with 
instructions to enter an Order for petitioner declaring that 
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the claimant was discharged for just cause and awarding 
petitioner recovery of all benefits assessed against petitioner, 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 4th day of November, 1985. 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & MCDONOUGH 
BYMAA^JC 
D a v i d R. Moi 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
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